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Now, these words I quote are not my words. They are the words of Professor Gilbert Murray of Oxford University, pronounced in an address in 1914. He concludes by saying "One may well be thankful that the strongest of the neutral powers"—referring to these United States—"is guided by a leader so wise and upright and temperate as President Wilson."

A LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE

BY WALTER L. FISHER,
Chicago.

The immediate cause that has involved the United States in war today is that our ships are being sunk and our people killed while they are lawfully engaged in peaceful commerce on the seas; but important as is the immediate protection of our national rights and of our people's lives against other nations who are engaged in war, this alone would not have drawn us into the war. We are at war because we believe there is a compelling necessity and a real opportunity "to make the world safe for democracy"; to end militarism as a political system; to destroy Prussianism as a national philosophy. We are at war, and our immediate task is to make war effectively. But if we cease for one moment to keep in mind the deep underlying purpose of our warfare, and the great object we hope and intend to accomplish by it, we shall weaken the very effectiveness of our warfare. We shall be of those who gain battles and yet lose a war. I agree entirely with the sentiment expressed by Senator Williams¹ with regard to that motto which should go upon the knapsack of the soldier, "Never again"; but unless the men and women of America who are not soldiers have that motto written in their hearts and express it in action, then indeed the sacrifice of the soldiers will have been in vain.

Two years ago Lord Grey uttered the profound truth that

Unless mankind learns from this war to avoid war the struggle will have been in vain. . . . Over humanity will loom the menace of destruction. If the world cannot organize against war, if war must go on . . . the resources and inventions of science will end by destroying the humanity they were meant to serve.

¹ See page 178.

And in December of last year, in one of the most remarkable and significant documents that have been published in Germany since the war began, Dr. Bernard Dernburg, formerly Colonial Secretary and for a time the accredited agent of Germany in this country, expressed almost identical views:

It certainly sounds foolhardy to speak of a reconciliation of nations in these times of bitterest hate when the slaughter of nations is at its zenith. Nevertheless it is necessary and inevitable. If no lasting peace comes, peace based on confidence alone, then inevitably there will come another war, and this new war can end only with the mutual annihilation of the nations of civilized Europe. Manly courage and manly strength are no longer the decisive factors; unfortunately the decisive factor is the machine. If mankind is to give thought for ten years more to machines for destroying life and property, another war at the present rate of technical development will mean the end of Europe.

. . . . International law is now a desolate heap of ruins, but it must be rebuilt and it must so regulate the relations of nations to each other that they must stand under its protection as free states, possessing equal rights, whether they be large or small. This protection must be exercised by the common power of all, either by force or by a common ban placed upon a transgressor which would be equivalent to barring him from intercourse with the rest of the world.

Nor should we overlook the declaration of the German Chancellor himself which led to Dr. Dernburg's discussion of the international situation:

When the world at last realizes what the awful ravages in property and life mean, then a cry for peaceful agreements and understandings will go through all mankind which will prevent in so far as it lies within human power the recurrence of such a tremendous catastrophe. This cry will be so loud and justified that it must lead to a result. Germany will honestly coöperate in the examination of every endeavor to find a practical solution and will collaborate for its possible realization.

President Wilson delivered a great speech when he stated to Congress the reasons which had compelled him to break off diplomatic relations with Germany, and to ask Congress to join him in declaring the existence of a state of war; but he delivered a far greater speech on January 22, 1917—a speech which, in my judgment, will live as the most important utterance of an American President since Abraham Lincoln spoke on the field of Gettysburg. If he or we lose sight of the reasoned utterances of that address or of the fundamental principles he stated, we shall just to that extent fail to grasp the issues and the opportunities of the titanic struggle of which we have now become a part.

It is said that these were but words and that what we need is deeds; that actions speak louder than words. May I suggest that words are sometimes deeds; and that the utterance of a speech like Lincoln's at Gettysburg or like Wilson's in the Senate may be as truly a deed as the unfurling of a standard about which men may rally, or the sounding of the bugle that calls them to the colors; and every ear that is deaf to that trumpet call, and every step that is taken away from that standard, lends aid and comfort to the enemy and lessens the chances of success in war and of a greater victory in peace.

We shall do well to turn, again and again, to the declarations of President Wilson when we were yet free from the hurries and the hatreds of war. If they were the words of truth and soberness three months ago, they are as true today and more sober.

In the very address which led to our declaration of the state of war, the President said:

I have exactly the same things in mind now that I had in mind when I addressed the Senate on the 22d of January last; the same that I had in mind when I addressed the Congress on the 3d of February and on the 26th of February. Our object now as then is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth insure the observance of those principles.

We will do well, therefore, to refresh our recollection of what the President did say on January 22:

. . . . The present war must first be ended; but we owe it to candor and to a just regard for the opinion of mankind to say that so far as our participation in guarantees of future peace is concerned it makes a great deal of difference in what way and upon what terms it is ended. . . . The question upon which the whole future peace and policy of the world depends is this: Is the present war a struggle for a just and secure peace or only for a new balance of power? If it be only a struggle for a new balance of power, who will guarantee, who can guarantee, the stable equilibrium of the new arrangement? Only a tranquil Europe can be a stable Europe. There must be, not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace.

Fortunately we have received very explicit assurances on this point. . . . But the implications of these assurances may not be equally clear to all—may not be the same on both sides of the water. I think it will be serviceable if I attempt to set forth what we understand them to be.

They imply first of all that it must be a peace without victory. It is not

pleasant to say this. I beg that I may be permitted to put my own interpretation upon it and that it may be understood that no other interpretation was in my thought. I am seeking only to face realities and to face them without soft concealments. Victory would mean peace forced upon the loser, a victor's terms imposed upon the vanquished. It would be adopted in humiliation, under duress at an intolerable sacrifice, and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory upon which terms of peace would rest, not permanently, but only as upon quicksand. Only a peace between equals can last; only a peace the very principle of which is equality and a common participation in a common benefit. The right state of mind, the right feeling between nations, is as necessary for a lasting peace as is the just settlement of vexed questions of territory or of racial and national allegiance. . . .

And the paths of the sea must alike, in law and in fact, be free. The freedom of the seas is the *sine qua non* of peace, equality and coöperation. . . . Difficult and delicate as these questions are, they must be faced with the utmost candor and decided in a spirit of real accommodation if peace is to come with healing in its wings and come to stay. . . . The statesmen of the world must plan for peace and nations must adjust and accommodate their policy to it as they have planned for war and made ready for pitiless contest and rivalry.

If these words are to rank as deeds and are to beget deeds, they must proceed resolutely from general principles to practical and definite proposals. It is absolutely imperative that we shall now, in the very midst of this war, while we are preparing for it and fighting in it, discuss the policies and formulate the plans which, in the words of President Wilson, are to result in "a world organized for justice and democracy." The plans may not be executed now, but their essential features must be devised and formulated now or they will never come into existence when peace is declared.

Even last November the *Times* said:

We agree that neutrals cannot do a better service to the cause of peace after the war than by the present discussion and advocacy of a practical system of the kind, if such a system can be devised.

And Lord Grey declared: "The best work the neutrals can do for the moment is to try to prevent a war like this from happening again."

If the discussion of the plans upon which a just and durable peace can be secured and maintained constitutes the most useful service which neutrals can perform in the midst of the war, this is also the most useful service which the belligerents can perform. A clear understanding of just what is to be the end of all the fighting can lessen the vigor of the fight only if there be some question of

the importance and the justice of the end. Now that we ourselves have ceased to be neutral, we have no higher duty to ourselves and to the world than to keep our minds open, our vision clear, our speech free, and our hands busy, for the accomplishment of the great purpose of the war, and we should have no understanding or commitment that will prevent us from making peace ourselves and from urging peace on others the instant that great purpose can in our judgment be obtained. Our fight is "to make the world safe for democracy." If in order to accomplish this it is necessary first to destroy militarism it is all important that we shall understand of what militarism consists, and we must not confuse militarism with its results nor fail to recognize it in our own councils and in the councils of our friends.

The essence of militarism is the belief that war is the natural, the necessary, the normal means by which international differences of opinion must be adjusted; it is the tendency to decry and to belittle the slow processes by which mankind as individuals and as nations has climbed up out of barbarism by substituting law for force. It is the conception of the state as something above and beyond moral law. Militarism is not ruthlessness; it is not cruelty; it is not savagery; it is the principle from which these evils spring. Once believe that war is inevitable and that preparedness for war is the only practicable assurance of peace, the inevitable result is the exaltation of force, the justification of cruelty, the acceptance of a despotic theory of the state, more blighting in its curse than the despotism of kaiser or king or czar. Once cease to plan for peace and there is nothing left but to plan for war. If mankind is to progress, if civilization is to go forward, nations must be held to the same moral standards as are individuals, and nations must progress little by little, step by step, as individuals have progressed. It is as true of international as of national or community affairs, that the progress of civilization can be exactly measured by the extent to which law has superseded force.

The issue that will confront the world at the close of this war, and which indeed confronts it now, is whether we are to put an end not only to militarism, but to the false doctrine that enduring economic interests can be promoted by force. Temporary advantages may be secured by the exploitation of other nations, espe-

cially—perhaps exclusively—undeveloped peoples and undeveloped lands, but in the long run the economic interests of the world are mutual. If, as we believe, the welfare of the mass of the people is the real test of national success, every nation has most to gain by helping to advance the trade of the world, to make all nations prosperous while fostering its own commerce by every means consistent with sound economic laws. Privilege may gain from exploitation, but not democracy; and democracy has come to stay as the economic, social and intellectual ideal of civilization even more than as a political ideal. So far as the happiness of the mass of mankind or of the masses of any particular nation is concerned, there should be neither exploitation nor a “war after the war” by hostile alliances in the world of trade.

I am advocating no diminution of the vigor with which we should prepare for and prosecute this war. I am merely insisting that we should know definitely for what we are fighting and for what we are to continue to fight. We have voted billions of money and authorized the training of millions of men. While these plans are being carried out with all the intelligence and energy which can be effectively applied to them we must not fail to see that even from the distinctively military point of view the formulation and announcement of plans for a just and durable peace is the most effective weapon we can wield. The presentation by the allied powers, with the support of the United States, and if possible of neutral nations, of a plan of international reorganization that would make it no longer possible for the Prussian military caste to persuade the German people that they must fight in self-defense would be worth more than millions of men on the fighting line in France.

Let no man belittle the influence of the argument of self-defense in Germany. It was Lloyd George himself who, at Queens Hall, in July, 1908, said:

Look at the position of Germany. Her army is what our navy is to us—her sole defense against invasion. She has not got a two-power standard. She may have a stronger army than France, than Russia, than Italy, than Austria, but she is between two great powers who in combination could pour in a vastly greater number of troops than she has. Don't forget that, when you wonder why Germany is frightened at alliances and understandings and some sort of mysterious workings which appear in the press and hints in the *Times* and the *Daily Mail*. . . . Here is Germany in the middle of Europe, with France and

Russia on either side and with a combination of their armies greater than hers. Suppose we had here a possible combination which would lay us open to invasion—suppose Germany and Russia, or Germany and Austria, had fleets which in combination would be stronger than ours, would we be not frightened, would we not arm?

We shall not remove this fear by defeating the German armies in the field or by imposing upon Germany the terms of peace. The English *Round Table* was right when it declared that "Prussianism, as a philosophy of war, will live until the German people themselves have rebelled against it." And a thoroughly posted and thoughtful American has said: "Germany can be made a liberal state only by her own liberals. No artificial liberalism imposed by the allies on a defeated Germany would last a month after the withdrawal of the allied army."

We must not make the mistake which has so discredited those intellectual leaders of Germany who by their manifesto demonstrated their inability to see anything but the German point of view. We must not make the mistake against which Burke warned us and attempt the indictment of a whole people. If we hope to make any progress toward permanent peace we must recognize that there are Germans who are not militaristic and who sincerely desire what we desire, even though we may sincerely disagree as to the methods by which it is to be accomplished. We must welcome every approach which such Germans make toward a better understanding; because our claim to infallibility is no better than is theirs, and it is of great importance to the world that the German people shall be brought to understand that militarism is not essential to their security or to their progress as a people.

If this is not the time for the formal offer of terms surely it is time to consider what these terms should be. If we are fighting for democracy, then democracy must discuss the terms upon which the fight shall cease. The old processes of secret diplomacy must end and they can end only by the substitution of free discussion which shall take place, so far as possible, before the event and not merely after it.

On April 2, President Wilson said:

Cunningly contrived plans of deception or aggression carried, it may be, from generation to generation, can be worked out and kept from the light only within the privacy of courts or behind the carefully guarded confidences of a

narrow and privileged class. They are happily impossible where public opinion commands and insists upon full information concerning all the nation's affairs.

The events of the past few weeks should—it seems to me—have removed from the minds of thinking men the last lingering doubt of the wisdom and the necessity of a League to Enforce Peace to which the United States shall be a party. We have been given a convincing demonstration that we cannot keep out of the war by avoiding international alliances. No matter how beneficent our purposes, how pacific our policies, peaceful isolation has become impossible in a world at war. If we would maintain our own peace we must do our part to maintain the peace of the world. And what is true of us is true of every other great nation. For weal or for woe the restless energy and inventive genius of man have knit the nations of the earth together; and the inexorable laws of industrial and social evolution have made out of many peoples one people for all the deep and vital issues that affect the future of mankind. We cannot avoid our share of world responsibility if we would, and we should not if we could.

More than a year ago I advocated before the House Committee on Military Affairs, and again before the Senate Committee last December, the creation of a citizen reserve, trained by and through the regular army, and the building of submarines and destroyers instead of dreadnaughts and battle cruisers, at least for the present—a policy that if adopted would have been of incalculable value to us; but “preparedness” for war on land and sea would not have saved us from becoming involved in this war, nor will it save us in the future. A million men in arms in the United States today would not have deterred Germany from her desperate resolve to rule the seas with terror that she might bring England to her knees. Even our allies impress upon us that the issue will be decided on the ocean. We have a navy substantially equal to that of any of the Allies except England and yet it does not keep us out of war. It is folly beyond belief to think that in the future we can build ships or train soldiers enough to protect our national interests if we are to stand alone in selfish isolation while the rest of the world is left in bitterness to tread the bloody wine press.

The progress of civilization is measured by the extent to which law has become a substitute for force or has been put in control over force. Within the nation—in all community affairs—this is ac-

cepted as axiomatic. It is a sound axiom for international relations. The punishment of crime and the settlement of the rights of persons and of property is now recognized almost—although not quite—universally to be the function of the state in all communities that claim to be civilized. In these very communities, however, this has been accomplished not by completely prohibiting fighting at the outset, but by first restricting and regulating private vengeance and resort to force. The first step toward peace is to delay war—private or public,—the second step is to prohibit it. A study of the history of civilization from its primitive beginnings discloses many illustrations, but time permits reference only to two.

One of the most interesting and significant of Anglo-Saxon institutions was the trial by battle, which was long recognized in England as a form of judicial procedure under which the parties litigant could settle their controversies and determine their rights by personal combat in the presence of the court; but this could be done only after resort to the peaceful processes of the tribunal. This rudimentary device for substituting law for force by delaying war was undoubtedly akin to the duel, which was originally established by the Germans, Danes and Franks as a judicial combat between the parties or their champions by which the guilt or innocence of individuals and property rights of many kinds, including rights in land and titles to estates, were determined. So universal was its application that only women, cripples, invalids and persons over sixty were excused from submitting themselves and their rights to personal combat. It was under the pseudo-chivalry of Francis I of France and Charles V of Spain that the duel attained its vogue as the "code of honor," under which "gentlemen" were permitted to commit murder under the sanction of an "unwritten law." Only recently has it been recognized as a survival of savage customs and standards. Even now, despite legal prohibitions, it lingers, not only in Germany, but elsewhere, as an evidence of retarded development, of intellectual and moral immaturity. Nevertheless, the duel marked a great advance over the chaotic reign of force which it superseded. As Colonel Benton said in his account of the duel between John Randolph and Henry Clay, "Certainly, duelling is bad, but not quite so bad as its substitutes—revolvers, bowie knives, blackguarding and street assassinations, under the pretext of self-defense." We have many men still left

among us whose conception of national honor and international relations has not yet progressed beyond the *code duello*, and some who oppose bringing nations up even to its standards. In the discussion to which I have already referred, after stating that the objects upon which the entire world is in agreement "are to be attained only by a supernational union of nations," Dr. Dernburg says:

To accomplish all this will be difficult, and there will be many ups and downs, since even among the most enlightened minds of Germany there is an indefinite prejudice against the loss of sovereignty and free agency which is implied in these ideas. Our Hindenburg, for instance, said, a few days ago: "Questions of honor and self-preservation can never be submitted to courts of arbitration." I take the liberty of differing with him. Every officer whose honor is insulted is not permitted to take up arms without further ado; he must submit to a court of honor composed of his friends, and these are in duty bound to try every means to bring about an honorable compromise. Nations too must do that. Naturally every duel is not avoided by such means, but if the officer, despite the decision of the court of honor, has recourse to weapons, he ceases to be an officer and disappears from among those of his caste. That is what will happen also among nations. They will not abide by decisions and they will bear the consequences. There are occasions among individuals as well as nations when destruction is preferred to surrender. Yet that is no argument against courts of honor and courts of arbitration. The object of both is to curb unjustified provocation and unbridled pugnacity. Moreover, the question of what is incompatible with honor or national existence is so elastic that to withdraw it from the jurisdiction of courts is equivalent to depriving every court decision of permanence, and thus doing away with trust in such decisions.

The League to Enforce Peace does not propose to prevent us from fighting if we wish; it merely requires us to go before a board of arbitration, or a council of conciliation before engaging in war. It does not undertake to enforce the award of the one or the recommendation of the other. This hideous world war may make it possible to go much further than this in international reorganization, but the strength of this movement at present lies in the moderation and simplicity of its proposals. It seeks to do today what can be done today in the way that is available today. It leaves to tomorrow the adoption of methods and the accomplishment of objects that tomorrow alone may make attainable. Quite sufficient for the day are the difficulties thereof and the advocates of this league of peace do not overlook or minimize them. They simply do not regard them as insuperable. Confident in the power of a great

purpose and in the resources of statecraft, they are the proponents of a principle not the draughtsmen of a treaty.

They propose a league open to all who accept its conditions—a league which binds its own members not to engage in war between themselves until they have first submitted their difference, if this difference is justiciable (which means determinable upon established principles of law or equity), to an international court or board of arbitration, or to a council of conciliation if the difference is one involving a conflict of national interests or policies not justiciable in their nature, such as the Monroe Doctrine or our policy with respect to oriental immigration. The nations joining the league agree to use their economic and if necessary their military forces against any of their number who begin hostilities without first resorting to the methods thus provided for the avoidance of war. In order that the field of adjudication may be steadily enlarged, the signatory powers are to hold conferences from time to time to formulate and codify the rules of international law, the results to be binding unless rejected by some power within a stated period.

I for one believe it would be an admirable thing if we had to define and defend the Monroe Doctrine at the bar of reason before resorting to its defense by war. We may ourselves conclude to modify some of our ancient declarations and to moderate some of our ancient claims. We all know that since Monroe initiated that doctrine, conditions have radically changed; and Monroe's declaration has been so altered and enlarged by various statesmen and publicists in this country that its putative father would certainly not recognize it in the forms it frequently assumes at the present time.

We are all probably familiar with the story of that man who was accused of being a traitor to his country because he did not believe in the Monroe Doctrine. He indignantly repelled the insinuation and said:

What, not believe in the Monroe Doctrine? I believe in it with all my heart, I would be willing to fight for it and if necessary to die for it. I never said I did not believe in the Monroe Doctrine. What I said was I did not know what the Monroe Doctrine is.

The Monroe Doctrine probably reached its extreme development when Richard Olney, as Secretary of State, declared that it meant in effect that "the United States is practically sovereign on

this continent." But it is of the greatest significance that only a few months before his death Secretary Olney, in an able discussion of these very matters, in the *North American Review*, demonstrated "the necessity of determining, with the least delay practicable, what our future Latin-American policy is to be," and said:

Shall we preserve, unchanged, our traditional attitude as the champion of every American state against foreign aggression, without regard to its consent or request or its preference to take care of itself or to seek some other ally than the United States, and without regard to the surely incurred hostility of the aggressive foreign power? It has often been claimed, and sometimes effectively asserted that the United States, in its own interest and for its own welfare, must firmly resist any surrender of independence or possession of territory by an American state to a foreign power, even if the same be entirely voluntary. Suppose, for example, that an American state undertook to permit an oversea power to plant a colony on its soil, and to convey to it a port or a coaling station, is the United States to resort to war, if necessary, in order to defeat the scheme? These are only some of the inquiries which go to show the necessity of a speedy and comprehensive revision of our Latin-American policy.

Why should we seek understanding and alliance with South America upon our common interests, while we reject alliances with Europe upon interests of vastly more importance to us than any interest we now have or are likely to have with the Argentine or Chili? By all means let us cement bonds of mutual interest and of mutual obligation with South America, but let us not refuse to do our part in a field of greater interest and of greater obligation. Let us not forget that truth which William G. Sumner announced, when he said: "If you want war, nourish a doctrine. Doctrines are the most frightful tyrants to which men ever are subject, because doctrines get into a man's own reason and betray him against himself."

So it is with that ancient doctrine that the United States should avoid "entangling alliances"—a phrase usually attributed to George Washington but in reality used by Thomas Jefferson, and a phrase which now needs at least some clarification. I have recently re-examined the history and contents of Washington's farewell address and Washington's illuminating correspondence relating to these matters; and it seems to me clear that if Washington were alive today he would be an ardent advocate of our participation in a league which President Wilson has well said is to create "not organized rivalries but an organized common peace." Nor is this

opinion based wholly on the stupendous change in world conditions since 1800, important as that consideration is.

Washington advised his countrymen under the conditions then existing against "permanent" alliances; but the context clearly demonstrates that what he had in mind was "*opposite* foreign alliances, attachments and intrigues," by avoiding which he said we would "avoid the necessity of those overgrown military establishments which, under any form of government, are inauspicious to liberty and which are to be regarded as particularly hostile to republican liberty."

In the farewell address what Washington warned us against was

permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular nations and passionate attachments for others. . . . Sympathy for the favorite nation, facilitating the illusion of an imaginary common interest in cases where no real common interest exists and infusing into one the enmities of the other, betrays the former into participation in the quarrels and wars of the latter without adequate inducement or justification.

In one of his letters to Lafayette, he said:

I would be understood to mean, I cannot avoid reflecting with pleasure on the probable influence that commerce may hereafter have on human manners and society in general. On these occasions I consider how mankind may be connected like one great family in fraternal ties.

Notwithstanding our warm attachment and great obligation to France for help in our Revolution, Washington steadfastly opposed our entry into the war between France and England, and in a letter to Monroe in 1796 he said:

My conduct in public and private life as it relates to the important struggle in which the latter (France) is engaged, has been uniform from the commencement of it and may be summed up in a few words: that I have always wished well to the French Revolution; that I have always given it as my decided opinion, that no nation had a right to intermeddle in the internal affairs of another; that everyone had a right to form and adopt whatever government they liked best to live under themselves; and that if this country could consistently with its engagements maintain a strict neutrality and thereby preserve peace it was bound to do so by motives of policy, interest and every other consideration that ought to actuate a people situated and circumstanced as we are, already deeply in debt and in a convalescent state from the struggle we have been engaged in ourselves.

Undoubtedly Woodrow Wilson, the student and teacher of

history, had these things in mind when, as President, he said in his great address before the Senate on January 22, 1917:

And in holding out the expectation that the people and government of the United States will join the other civilized nations of the world in guaranteeing the permanence of peace upon such terms as I have named, I speak with the greater boldness and confidence because it is clear to every man who can think that there is in this no breach in either our traditions or our policy as a nation, but a fulfillment rather of all that we have professed or striven for.

I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world: that no nation should seek to extend its policy over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own policy, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful.

I am proposing that all nations henceforth avoid entangling alliances which would draw them into competitions of power, catch them in a net of intrigue and selfish rivalry, and disturb their own affairs with influences intruded from without. There is no entangling alliance in a concert of power. They all unite to act in the same sense and with the same purpose all act in the common interest and are free to live their own lives under a common protection.

One objection is sometimes made to the league which indicates a complete misunderstanding of its proposals. It is said that if we and Germany were now in such a league we should have to sit supinely by during the process of arbitration or conciliation while Germany continued to sink our ships and kill our people. Nothing could be farther from the truth. On the exact contrary, Germany would be bound to discontinue the particular acts of which we complain until the report of the board of arbitration or the council of conciliation, or we and all the other signatory powers would unite against her. The very language of the third proposal is:

The signatory powers shall jointly use forthwith, both their economic and military forces against any one of their number that goes to war or *commits acts of hostility* against another of the signatories before any question arising shall be submitted as in the foregoing.

The discussion as to this league would not be complete without the voice that cries that it would be unconstitutional. We may entangle ourselves by agreement to defend the national independence of Panama or Cuba, we may agree not to use dum-dum bullets or to engage in privateering, we may agree to arbitrate our differences about the Alabama claims or the Newfoundland fisheries, but we must not agree to present future disputes to any tribunal

or council before we plunge ourselves and perhaps the world in war. There are always those to assert that it is unconstitutional to do whatever they do not want done; but the Constitution of the United States contains few limitations of the treaty-making power and none that prohibit such treaties as are involved in establishing a league to enforce peace. It is not proposed to take away the treaty making power, but to act under it. We are a sovereign nation for the assumption of obligations as well as for the assertion of rights. The obligations we assume will be far outweighed by the rights we shall gain. Whatever it may cost will be but a fraction of the tax in manhood and in money that is involved in preparation for war, to say nothing of participation in war.

The allied powers in their reply to President Wilson give to the previous statements of the responsible statesmen of most of the great neutral and belligerent nations, including Germany, this solemn sanction:

In a general way they (the Allies) desire to declare their respect for the lofty sentiments inspiring the American note and their whole-hearted agreement with the proposal to create a league of nations which shall assure peace and justice throughout the world.

They recognize all the benefits which will accrue to the cause of humanity and civilization from the institution of international arrangements designed to prevent violent conflicts between nations and so framed as to provide the sanctions necessary to their enforcement, lest an illusory security should serve merely to facilitate fresh acts of aggression.

Here then is a proposal, which, so far as it goes, as useful as it may prove, whether it succeeds or fails in accomplishing all its advocates expect, is at least a move in the right direction. It will at least diminish the causes and the occasions of war. Therefore we, the people of the United States, desiring peace, willing to take our part in the great family of nations, should be willing to contribute whatever is necessary to further the most practical plan which has thus far been suggested for avoiding another unspeakable catastrophe such as the one now plunging the world in misery; and thus to aid those forces which work for civilization and for the peaceful progress of mankind.